In A Theory of Art, Karol Berger undertakes something that many readers will think is no longer possible: a theory of art in the grand, traditional style, that is, a philosophical specification of the nature of art in general, comprehending various works in various media in various historical periods. This philosophical specification is also intended to yield an account of the value of art-as though works as diverse as Bart6k's quartets, Whitman's poems, Jean Renoir's The River, and the novels of Dickens all have some common value. Berger's ambition is both breathtaking and welcome. If we are not able to say something general about art and its value, then we are in danger of reducing the values of artworks to one or another form of exterior instrumentality: political, economic, cognitive, religious, or tribal, as may be the case.
Berger begins in chapters 1 and 2 by considering the media of art and the uses of works of art. He suggests that most philosophy of art is mistakenly preoccupied with the identification of works of art. In contrast, he says, "I am trying to shift the focus of aesthetics to the question, What should the function of In this brief survey I have omitted whole topic areas-dance therapy, kinesiology, and festivals, among others-and repeatedly swerved toward the West because of my own training and bent. I hope nonetheless to have disclosed some sense of the IED's broad geographical coverage, as well as the adventurousness of its editors, the high caliber of its contributors, the freshness of its research, the eclecticism of its disciplinary approaches, and the efficiency and sometimes downright excellence of its writing. For despite the IED's imperfections, quirks, and occasional lacunae, it stands as a great achievement whose editors have accomplished the feat, as the first edition of the New Grove did twenty years ago, of commissioning essays (some of which will stand as classics) from scholars and writers at the top of their professions, and publishing an encyclopedia that immediately established itself as indispensable. (And more so than the 1980 Grove, it must be noted, the IED reached both across disciplinary boundaries and into the realm of the practitioner when recruiting its contributors.) The IED is now by far the most comprehensive and rigorous dance reference source available-one that also closes many longstanding gaps in dance scholarship and sets a new standard for it. It has solved the problem noted some time ago by Agnes deMille, who lamented the lack of an inclusive reference work on dance thus: "Nothing is comprehensive, nothing catholic, nothing sweeping, and this we must have" (l:xxx 
distinct nature) if and only if (1) art has an indispensable cultural function, (2) that function is fillfillable by it alone (so that art has no external purposes), and (3) that function is fulfilled by much existing art (so that our theory will not be a mere philosopher's abstraction, out of touch with what is actually made and cared about as art) (p. 11).
What, then, is the indispensable cultural function that the things we centrally care about as art uniquely fulfill? In specifying the function of art, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and others all helped themselves in part to a general account of the functions of things. For Aristotle, nature is the result of, and is useful for, divine intelligence contemplating itself in and through its embodiment in things; human rational nature is a privileged site of this work of divine intelligence, since it alone is capable of rationally investigating the rest of nature; and artistic imitations are generated as part of rational humanity's reflection on its own situation, functions, and limitations. Kant offers a similar, but sparser and more frankly conjectural, teleology of human reason in relation to nature. Hegel and Heidegger, in reaction to Kant, offer something once again thicker. But none of these accounts of the functions of nature, of rational humanity, or of art is likely, on its own, to prove persuasive. They seem too conjectural and too likely to privilege one form of artistic practice in the face of art's legitimate varieties (as in Heidegger's casting of Greek temples and Hol61derlin's hymns as nearly the only genuine works of art). Human beings have, it seems, multiple interests rather than any single defining function, and works of art seem to come in different shapes so as to answer to those diverse human interests. So how, now, plausibly, can we talk about the function of art?
Berger's response to this question is to reflect simultaneously on a considerable range of past works in various media and on how a function definitive of art might better or best be fulfilled now. To adopt this method is selfconsciously to make the philosophy of art less abstract, to bring it into closer alignment with criticism. The philosophy of art will hence have simultaneously a representationalist-realist dimension (describing much of what has been most plausibly regarded as art) and a critical-utopian dimension (evaluating the past and pointing to what art might be in the future). The philosophy of art must be both an account and an argument, both attentive to the past and normative for the future. In simultaneously representing artistic practice and recommending ways of continuing it, the philosophy of art will itself be an ongoing practice of responsive critical reflection, not a completable quasi-science. With the advent of "Classical" style from roughly 1780 to 1820, purely instrumental music-as Schopenhauer, Hanslick, Dahlhaus, and others have argued-becomes centrally important as a way of "giving expression to an essential metaphysical region inaccessible to language" (p. 135). This later shift returns to the idea that music has metaphysical significance, but its significance is now to present the vicissitudes of an inexhaustible longing within, not a harmonious cosmos without. With increasing secularization and changes in the patronage system, artists of all kinds come to feel that their work-expressing their aspirations for deep social reciprocity or communion-is both significant and yet lacks any ready audience. "By presenting instrumental discourses of considerable size, discourses the internal coherence and sense of which were based on the harmonic and motivic logic of tonal relations, mature Viennese symphonies and string quartets demanded to be taken seriously as objects of aesthetic contemplation" (p. 138). Throughout the nineteenth century, this achievement of Viennese "Classical" style music fractures into a "competition" (p. 139) between the frank mimeticism of program music and the avantgardism of abstract absolute music, and the hold of art music on its audiences becomes less secure.
Avant-gardist anti-mimeticism comes to dominance in the early twentieth century. Schoenberg and his successors at Darmstadt attempted to work out significant patterns of purely musical gesture that would resist both the insinuating but trivial charms of an increasingly broad entertainment culture and the political engineering of culture by the likes of Stalin and Zhdanov. But their gestures of resistance become increasingly formal and empty. As they depart further from mimesis, they face a threat of sheer emptiness and unreceivability, leading Berger to ask whether the "threat of meaninglessness" that attends abstract art music's separation from all mimeticism can be overcome (p. 149).
Here Berger suggests that we might hope for "some form of rapprochement and accommodation between the abstract and mimetic ideas, a refertilization of abstraction with mimesis" (p. 150). We can already sense something of this in musicology in Anthony Newcomb's work on "archetypal plots" of purely abstract works (p. 150)3 and in musical works that indulge in anthropomorphic gestures, figurative titles, allusions and quotations, and invocations of practical or social functions of music such as dance. Among contemporary composers who strike him as usefully working to bring abstraction and mimesis together in music, Berger lists Ligeti, Penderecki, Carter, Lutoslawski, and Berio.
These trends inspire hope that the canon of art music has not been closed with the generation of the 1880s. The perspectives of new music seem brighter today than at any point in the last fifty years, as the hunger for art carrying a spiritual significance reasserts itself and as the mid-century Cold War conditions become a faint memory.... What becomes increasingly more likely ... is that the best composition today will attract more than the professionals and the canon will expand again, because the most ambitious and talented composers will no longer see any need to continue the self-mutilating ban on mimesis and tonality, no longer feel that they must speak an artificial Esperanto or not be heard at all. (p. 151)
